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ABSTRACT 
A novel approach is provided for evaluating the benefits and burdens from 
vehicle modularity in fleets/units through the analysis of a game theoretical model 
of the competition between autonomous vehicle fleets in an attacker-defender 
game. We present an approach to obtain the heuristic operational strategies 
through fitting a decision tree on high-fidelity simulation results of an intelligent 
agent-based model. A multi-stage game theoretical model is also created for 
decision making considering military resources and impacts of past decisions. 
Nash equilibria of the operational strategy are revealed, and their characteristics 
are explored. The benefits of fleet modularity are also analyzed by comparing the 
results of the decision making process under diverse operational situations.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Military vehicles encounter diverse operational 
environments and use-case scenarios which 
demand flexibility and diversity in functional 
requirements of vehicles in a fleet. Some vehicles 
may also have specialized tactical functions and 
significant amounts of expendable resources. 
Changes in tactical needs and technological 
updates make the adaptation of such fleets and 
their immediate reuse after a mission difficult [1]. 
The US Army aims to keep such scenarios to a 
minimum, and to increase efficiencies in 
operations, by requiring that fleets of vehicles be 
re-utilizable across a variety of mission scenarios.  
One option to achieve such flexibility is the 
introduction of vehicle modularity [2], wherein 
vehicles are built from swappable components 
known as modules. These modules include 
physical variants with varied functionalty that 
enable fast upgrades and efficient adaptation. 
Design of such modular vehicles has been 
explored extensively in the past, with various 
proposals addressing diverse military requirements, 
such as the armored vehicle family [3] and future 
combat systems [4]. Main advantages of modular 
vehicle fleets are their cost-effectiveness as well 
as their flexibility in operations achivable through 
plug-in/pull-out actions on the base and possibly 
on the battlefield [5]. The capability of performing 
these assembly, disassembly and reconfiguration 
actions (ADR) distinguishes modular fleets from 
conventional fleets and enable adjustments in 
configuration in reacting to demands in real-time.  
While modularity offers additional flexibility in 
fleet operation, its advantages may be squandered 
by inadequate fleet operation strategies. The 
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management of a modular fleet presents new 
challenges, especially considering the highly 
uncertain demands created by intelligent 
adversaries. In the past, operation management 
techniques have been applied to study the 
reduction of operational and supply cost of 
modular fleets by using an agent-based approach 
[6,7]. However, those studies made simplifying 
assumptions including deterministic values of 
demands and stationary adversarial behavior.  
Relaxing these constraints, Li & Epureanu [8] 
proposed an attacker-defender game to simulate 
the competition between two adversarial and 
intelligent military forces. The benefits and 
burdens of modularity are revealed by simulating 
an attacker-defender game wherein the modular 
fleet operated against a conventional fleet. The 
modular and conventional fleets are randomly 
designated as attacker or defender. The objective 
of the defender is the satisfaction of the delivery 
of a convoy with consideration of possible 
attributes reduction due to vehicle damage. The 
goal of the attacker is to disrupt the defender from 
satisfying the demands. The modular fleet showed 
a better performance in the intelligent competition. 
With additional operational flexibility from ADR 
actions, the modular fleet exhibited a better 
adaptability and was less predictable because of its 
added operational flexibility. However, because of 
the complexity of the model, strategic interactions 
between decision makers were not obvious. Also, 
the equilibrium strategies and their evolution at 
different stages of the game was not identified.  
In this paper, we address these issues through a 
data-driven appoach. The simulation data from the 
attacker-defender game is fit into two 
approximated models, namely a decision tree (DT) 
model and a game theoretical model, for gaining 
insights into the benefits and burdens of fleet 
modularity. DTs have been used in the past in 
diverse areas such as expert systems, signal 
classification and decision analysis. DTs have also 
been used in the management of military operation 
planning [9], software systems [10], and predition 
of adversarial actions [11]. The most important 
feature of a DT is the capacity to break the comlex 
decision-making process into a collection of 
simpler decisions to provide a interpretable 
solution. Through fitting of competition history 
between intelligent agents, a DT is used as a tool 
to analyze and reveal the popular heuristics of the 
intelligent entity.  
Game-theory is an analysis technique for 
describing strategic interactions and their likely 
outcomes between multiple players. The games 
can be analyzed to find the equilibrium points and 
suggest the beneficial strategies. Game theoretical 
models have been widely used to simulate a large 
variety of military scenarios: information warfare 
[12], cyber attacks [13], submarine war [14], and 
sensor networks [15]. There are also several 
studies focused on attacker-defender games that 
consider resource-dependent strategies. For 
example, Powell [16] used a game-theoretical 
approach to find the defender’s resource allocation 
strategy for protecting resources from being 
destroyed, which leads to the Bayesian-Nash 
equilibrim. Hausken and Zhuang [17] formulated 
an attacker-defender game where a defender 
decides to use the resources to protect themselves 
or attack the adversary for multiple time points. In 
this study, a game theoretical model is formualted 
to fit the simulation results from our previous 
model [8] and shows the impact of length of game 
in the decision making.  
In section 2, we first brief our previous approach 
of formulating an attacker-defender game between 
two intelligent and adversarial forces. In section 3, 
the DT model is introduced for mining the 
heuristics of fleet operation. In section 4, a game 
theoretical model is built to find the equilibrium 
strategies in a multi-period game. In section 5, we 
draw conclusions and discuss a prospective future 
research direction.   
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Table 1: Available strategies for the attacker and the defender and the corresponding ranges of safety levels  
2. Intelligent Agent-Based Model  
 Military demands are time-varying and highly 
uncertain because commanders react to adversarial 
actions. To capture these characteristics, an 
attacker-defender game is created between two 
hostile vehicle fleets assuming all vehicles are 
autonomous. The game is formulated as a 
transportation mission with uncertain assaults 
from the adversary. Demands are stochastically 
generated at battlefields specifying the 
requirements for the delivery, i.e., firepower, 
capacity. The fleet to satisfy the demands becomes 
the defender with the goal of delivering a convoy 
with sufficient attributes that satisfy the 
requirements. The other fleet becomes the attacker  
with the goal of disrupting the defender by an 
assault convoy. Vehicles in convoys are 
stochastically damaged during confrontations, 
which reduces the magnitude of the attributes of 
vehicles and convoys.  
To increase the probability of winning a mission, 
the defender can infer the possible adversarial 
attack strategy to prepare sufficient vehicles in the 
convoy in case of possible damage during the 
confrontation. Denote the safety level for the 
defender/attacker as the ratio between actual 
attributes and demand requirements. 10 strategies 
are created for both the attacker and the defender, 
as shown in Table 1.  
Concerning the efficiency and fidelity of the 
model, agents with different functionality are 
created to collaboratively make the operational 
and dispatch decisions. Following the previous 
work [8], three types of agents are defined as:  
 Inference agent: to analyze adversarial future 
actions based on historical records  
Attack Strategy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Firepower [0,  0.5) [0.5,  1) [1,  1.5) [1.5,  2) [2,  2.5) [2.5,  3) [3,  3.5) [3.5,  4) [4,  4.5) [4.5,  ∞) 
Defense Strategy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   10 
Firepower [0,  1) [1,  1.5) [1,  1.5) [1,  1.5) [1.5,  2) [1.5,  2) [1.5,  2) [2,  ∞) [2,  ∞) [2,  ∞) 
Capacity    [0,  1) [1,  1.5) [1.5,  2) [2,  ∞) [1,  1.5) [1.5,  2) [2,  ∞) [1,  1.5) [1.5,  2) [2,  ∞) 
Figure 1: The attacker-defender game between the modular fleet and the conventional fleet  
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 Dispatch agent: to determine optimal 
dispatch orders based on feasibility and 
success rate  
 Base agent: to schedule ADR actions and 
repair actions to fulfill dispatch orders  
The attacker-defender game is used to simulate 
the competition between a conventional fleet and a 
modular fleet with no resupply. All damaged 
vehicles and components can only be reused after 
a long repair (recovery) time. The simulation is 
separated into two stages: (1) the stochastic stage, 
where each fleet randomly selects the dispatch 
strategy, and (2) the intelligent stage where each 
fleet makes decisions through and artificial 
intelligence analysis that uses models trained by 
data collected from the stochastic stage.  
Downtime is considered in the attacker-defender 
game, which includes the time for ADR actions 
and vehicle recovery. In this study, the vehicle 
downtime is calculated by summing the 
processing time required for each action. For 
example, the time to reconfigure a vehicle from 
one type to another is the sum of time needed to 
disassemble the modules from old types and the 
time to assemble the new modules required by the 
new types. In this study, the time for module 
assembly is 1 hour, for module disassembly is 0.5 
hours, and for module recovery is 10 hours. 
Previous studies have shown that different values 
of downtime change the modular fleet behaviors 
[7]. In this study, changes in the downtime will 
also impact the simulation outcomes of the 
attacker-defender game, which change the analysis 
results in this study.   
Previous work has shown the benefits and 
burdens of modularity in terms of the win rate and 
the ability to avoid being inferred. In this study, 
we analyze those results in a new perspective to 
gain actionable insights from the data through two 
simplified models with high interpretability: (a) a 
DT for extracting heuristic rules from high-fidelity 
data, and (b) a game theoretical model for 
discovering game Nash equilibria.  
 
3. Decision Tree (DT)  
DTs are popular decision analysis tool which are 
used here to interpret the decision making process 
of each fleet. A DT is a flowchart like tree 
structure. Each node of the tree indicates a certain 
operational situation. The value represents the 
number of winning cases (1) and losing cases (0) 
in that situation. Each edge of the tree denotes an 
operational condition, e.g., attack strategy ≤ 
strategy 3. A node with two branches creates a 
single-stage classifier, which provides an intuitive 
comparison of the payoffs by making different 
decisions in the given situation.  
Figure 2.1: DT of the modular fleet engaged as the defender. 
Figure 2.2: DT of the conv. fleet engaged as the defender. 
Figure 2.3: DT of the modular fleet engaged as the attacker. 
Figure 2.4: DT of the conv. fleet engaged as the attacker. 
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The DT is trained by partitioning the training set 
by the operational condition. The goal of each 
partition is to increase the purity of separated 
subsets. The partition ends once the threshold of 
purity is reached. The purity is measured by 
entropy, a value that describes the chaos of a set, 
expressed by  
entropy =  ∑ −𝑝𝑖 log2 𝑝𝑖
𝑖=1
𝑖=0
. 
 
where, 𝑝𝑖 is the probability of winning (𝑖 = 1) and 
losing (𝑖 = 0). The condition that minimizes the 
total entropy of the subset is selected for partition. 
During training, the situations with high purity of 
values, i.e., high probability of winning or losing, 
are highlighted as the left nodes of the tree.  
The training set is created based on the 
simulation results of 20 randomly created 3-year 
attacker-defender games. Only the results 
collected during the intelligent operation stage are 
used. The training set is initially separated into 4 
subsets according to the attacker and defender 
roles and fleet types to highlight the differences 
due to modularity. The DTs for both fleets are 
shown in Fig. 2.  
Based on these results, two important separation 
strategies are discovered that change the win-lose 
case: strategy 5 for the defender and strategy 2 for 
the attacker. Comparing Fig. 2.1 and Fig. 2.2, the 
modular fleet uses attack strategy 1 more frequent 
than the conventional fleet. The conventional fleet 
suffers a higher risk of losing when the modular 
fleet adopts attack strategy 1. Because the modular 
fleet makes more accurate prediction of the 
adversary, attack strategy 1 is more frequently 
used once a weak defense strategy of the 
conventional fleet is predicted. 
Comparing Fig. 2.3 and Fig. 2.4, the modular 
fleet has a higher probability of winning when 
competing against a well-prepared adversarial 
defense convoy (46.9% vs. 33.9%). The modular 
fleet utilizes a strong attack strategy, i.e., ≥ attack 
strategy 4, to stay in the lead of the game. These 
results suggest that the higher win rate is due to 
the flexibility gained from fleet modularity. For 
the modular fleet, the idle transportation vehicles 
in the attack mission can be reconfigured to 
combat vehicles by swapping the capacity module 
with the weapon module to temporarily enhance 
the firepower of a convoy, which forms a stronger 
attack strategy.  
 
4. Game Theoretical Model  
Training the intelligent agent-based model is 
time-consuming. This increases the difficulty of 
proving the convergence and stability of the 
results. A multi-stage game model is created and 
fitted by using high-fidelity simulated data for 
performing a theoretical analysis. Each game is 
used to describe a single stage in the fleet 
competition. An example payoff matrix of a 
single-stage game is shown in Tab. 2.  
 𝑑1 𝑑2 𝑑3 𝑑𝑗 𝑑10 
𝑎1 (100,0) (89,11) (47,53) … (0,100) 
𝑎2 (100,0) (98, 2) (85,15) … (0,100) 
𝑎3 (100,0) (100,0) (90,10) … (0,100) 
𝑎𝑖 … … … (𝑟𝑚𝑖1𝑐𝑗1 , 𝑟𝑐𝑗1𝑚𝑖1) … 
𝑎10 (100,0) (100,0) (100,0) … (49,51) 
 
Denote by 𝑟𝑚𝑖
𝑡𝑐𝑗
𝑡  the payoff of the game that the 
modular fleet selects strategy 𝑖  and conventional 
fleet selects strategy 𝑗  in the 𝑡𝑡ℎ  stage. In this 
study, the payoffs are defined as the probabilities 
of wining, calculated by  
 
𝑟𝑚𝑖
1𝑐𝑗
1 =
𝑛(mod use 𝑖 & conv use 𝑖 & 𝑚𝑜𝑑. 𝑤𝑖𝑛 )
𝑛(mod use 𝑖 & conv use 𝑗 )
 
 
where 𝑛(𝑋)  is the number of samples in the 
training set that satisfy condition 𝑋.  
The decision selected at the first stage may 
change the available decisions in games at the 
second stage due to the limitation in resources. For 
example, if the defender gives up the task at stage 
1, i.e., if the defender choses strategy 1, then there 
is a high probability for the defender to perform a 
Table 2: Payoff matrix for a single-stage game  
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stronger strategy at stage 2, i.e., to choose one of 
the strategies 8, 9, or 10. However, if strategy 10 
is used at stage 1, then strategy 1 may be the only 
available strategy at the stage 2. The payoffs for 
the unavailable strategies are zero, so availability 
of strategies changes the payoff matrix thus 
changing the game. Figure 3 shows an example of 
results obtained from the game model.  
Denote the payoff matrices of the possible game 
𝑘 at stage 1 as 𝑅𝑘
1, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, the payoff matrix of the 
modular fleet in the second game 𝑅
𝑚𝑖
1
2  can be 
calculated as  
𝑅
𝑚𝑖
1
2 = ∑ ∑ 𝑅𝑘
1𝑝(𝑘|𝑚𝑖
1, 𝑐𝑗
1)
𝑗=10
𝑗=1
𝑘=𝐾
𝑘=1
 
 
where 𝑝(𝑘|𝑚𝑖
1, 𝑐𝑗
1)  is the probability of playing 
game 𝑘  at stage 2 given modular fleet selected 
strategy 𝑖  and given that the conventional fleet 
selected strategy 𝑗  at stage 1. By adding new 
conditions for the strategy selected at stage 2, we 
can also compute the payoff matrices for stage 3 
as 𝑅
𝑚𝑖
1,𝑚𝑝
2
3 .  
Assume the impact of a decision can only last for 
three stages, a stochastic three-stage game can be 
formed to represent the attacker-defender game. 
Each payoff matrix is a 10 by 10 matrix. Vertex 
enumeration is applied to find the Nash 
equilibrium of this high-dimensional game [18]. 
To find the equilibrium strategy for a multi-stage 
game, we followed dynamic programming to 
solve the problem in a back-propagation manner. 
For this three-stage game, the procedures are:  
1. Find the Nash equilibria and the corresponding 
payoffs of all possible games at stage 3.  
2. Compute the payoff matrix that sums the 
payoffs at stage 2 and stage 3.  
3. Find the strategy of stage 2 that leads to a Nash 
equilibrium for both stage 2 and stage 3.  
4. Compute the payoff matrix that sums the 
payoffs at the first, second, and third stages.  
5. Find the strategy at the first stage that will led 
to the Nash equilibrium for the first, second, 
and third stage. 
A more detailed description of the algorithm is 
provided in Fig. 4. For a special case where the 
modular fleet plays as attacker-attacker-defender 
in three stages, the equilibrium strategies at 
different stages are shown in Tab. 3.  
 
 Fleet Stage1 Stage2 Stage3 
Single 
Stage 
Modular 𝑎10 N/A N/A 
Conv. 𝑑10 N/A N/A 
Two 
Stage 
Modular 𝑎9 𝑎5 N/A 
Conv. 𝑑10 𝑑5 N/A 
Three 
Stage 
Modular 𝑎8 𝑎2 𝑑10 
Conv. 𝑑10 𝑑9 𝑎5 
 
The evolution of the equilibrium strategy is 
observed when changes in the number of stages of 
the game are considered. For a one-stage game, 
the equilibrium strategies are the strongest 
strategies for both the attacker and the defender. 
However, once the second stage is considered, the 
modular fleet saves part of the attack force at stage 
1 for forming an attack convoy at stage 2. Once a 
third stage is considered, more attack force has 
been reserved for protecting the transportation 
convoy at stage 3 (last stage). With limited 
Figure 3: Three-stage game theoretical model with 
consideration the impact of previous decisions and 
assignment of attacker and defender. Table 3: Equilibrium strategy of game with different periods  
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resources and consideration of risk of damage, 
each fleet needs to trade off the success rate in the 
current stage and the impact for operations at 
future stages.  
 
 
5. Conclusions  
In conclusion, this study provides a novel 
approach for evaluating the benefits and burdens 
of fleet modularity through the analysis of the 
competition between autonomous fleets in an 
attacker-defender game. An approach based on a 
decision tree was proposed for mining the 
operation heuristics and finding the main changes 
in fleet operation strategy once modularity is 
available. In addition, equilibria of operational 
strategy evolution over three stages were 
identified. The modular fleet outperforms the 
conventional fleet due to its additional flexibility 
in operation that makes it harder to predict by 
opponents. In the future, the stabilized win rate 
can be calculated by formulating an infinitely 
repeated game with proved convergence.  
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